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THE U.S. MILITARY’S “MARITIME STRATEGY” AND FUTURE
TRANSFORMATION

Wang Baofu

In October 2007, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard jointly released the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” which aroused
widespread attention in international military circles. The new U.S. “maritime
strategy” focuses on future security threats. It not only puts forward some new
concepts, but also demonstrates many aspects of future military strategic adjustment and the development trends of military transformation.
1. THE U.S. MILITARY’S “MARITIME STRATEGY” IS PROFOUNDLY
INFLUENCED BY [AMERICA’S] SEA POWER TRADITION
The United States is a country with a tradition of being a “sea power.” It can be
said that the ability of the United States to become the world hegemon is directly
related to its understanding of the oceans, its comprehension of sea power, and
[its] emphasis on maritime force development. And this tradition originates
from the prominent American geostrategic scholar Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan’s “Sea Power” thinking had long-term influence on the development and
evolution of U.S. maritime strategy. This point can be seen very clearly from
America’s modern development and historical trajectory.
After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. maritime strategy was repeatedly
revised, but never separated itself from Mahan’s sea power theory. In 1991, in
order to adapt to changes in the maritime security environment, and more effectively use maritime power, the United States specially established a “naval
strategic research group” and quickly introduced the maritime strategy white
paper “From Sea to Land,” [thereby] revising the long-adhered-to “Maritime
Strategy.” “Forward deployment” changed to “forward presence,” having a foothold in “maritime operations” changed to “from sea to land,” [and] “independently implementing large-scale sea warfare” changed to “support army and air
force joint operations.”
The “9/11” terrorist attacks produced a tremendous assault on the U.S. security concept. National security and military strategy underwent a major adjustment. The U.S. maritime strategy changed accordingly. It put forward the goal
of constructing naval forces possessing information superiority; devoted to developing forward presence, maritime capability for comprehensive superiority
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in land assault, and information warfare; and addressing twenty-first century
maritime security threats.
This time, the introduction of the U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy”
can be said to be one of the most far-ranging adjustments in the last twenty
years. It not only has new judgments and positions concerning maritime security threats, but more importantly has new thinking regarding how to use military power to meet national security objectives. This is the greatest distinction
between the new “maritime strategy” and its predecessor.
2. THE U.S. “MARITIME STRATEGY” PUTS FORWARD NEW THINKING
REGARDING HOW TO ADDRESS SECURITY THREATS
The most prominent feature of the U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” is to
put “preventing war and winning war” in equally important positions. The pursuit of absolute military superiority, stressing the defeat of any opponent, has always been the core of U.S. military strategy. The objective of using military force
to prevent war is embodied to some extent in U.S. military strategic deterrence
theory, but it is very rarely placed at the same level as winning wars in important
strategic documents. In the new “maritime strategy,” this type of overbearing,
offensive language is relatively reduced, and there is noticeably more emphasis
on “strategic cooperation” to jointly address future maritime security threats.
The concept of “cooperation” put forward by the new strategy refers not only
to cooperation among the three strategic forces of the Navy, Marine Corps,
and Coast Guard, but also to military strength and national cooperation in the
fields of diplomacy, etc.; even more important is the emphasis on international
cooperation. The new strategy stresses that the majority of the world’s population lives within several hundred kilometers from the ocean, 90 percent of
world trade is dependent on maritime transport, [and] maritime security has a
direct bearing on the American people’s way of life. Faced with the increasingly
serious maritime threats, “no country [in the world] has adequate resources
or forces to ensure the security of the entire maritime area,” no single country
has the ability to deal with international terrorism single-handedly. Therefore,
international “strategic cooperation” is an important way to achieve maritime
security. Likewise, developments in globalization and informatization* will
also propel the evolution of naval strategies.
* Chinese sources use the term “informatization” [信息化] to describe the utilization of information
technology, networks, and even command automation to improve military performance. For
details on the role of “informatization” in transforming China’s navy, see Andrew Erickson and
Michael Chase, “Information Technology and China’s Naval Modernization,” Joint Forces Quarterly
50, no. 3 (2008), pp. 24–30; and “PLA Navy Modernization: Preparing for ‘Informatized’ War at
Sea,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 8, no. 5 (29 February 2008), pp. 2–5, available at www
.jamestown.org.
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To implement the new “maritime strategy,” the U.S. military proposed huge
programs to develop a “thousand-ship Navy,” [and] build “Global Fleet Stations.” The purpose for developing the “thousand-ship Navy” is to strengthen
allied naval cooperation and communication, through joint maritime operations involving each nation, and deal with the increasingly complex maritime
security environment. By building “Global Fleet Stations,” naval forces will provide global protection. To achieve this goal, the U.S. military has already begun
to deploy new “Fleet Stations” in world focal point regions. This new concept
. . .美国能够成为世界霸权国家与其 . . .对海上力量发展的重视有直接关系. . . .
马汉的“海权” 思想对美国海上战略的发展演变产生了长远的影响.
The ability of the United States to become the world hegemon is directly related to its . . . emphasis
on maritime force development. . . . Mahan’s “Sea Power” thinking had long-term influence on the
development and evolution of U.S. maritime strategy.
advanced in the strategic documents of the U.S. military can only be regarded as
a major transformation in its understanding of the application of military force
in the realization of national interests, following setbacks in earlier unilateralist
and preemptive strategy.
Although the U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” elaborates on the importance of “international cooperation,” it has not given up its maritime hegemonic mentality. Regarding core national interests at sea, such as the right to
freedom of action at sea, sea lane control, and deploying forces in important
strategic regions, the new strategy and the three sea power principles put forward by Mahan of maritime military strength, overseas military bases, and sea
line control are exactly the same; it can [therefore] be said that the U.S. “maritime strategy” has the same spirit.
3. THE “MARITIME STRATEGY” INDICATES SOME CHANGES IN THE
NATURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY’S FUTURE EVOLUTION
The U.S. military’s new “maritime strategy” was deliberated for two years before being issued. This period coincided with a time during which the United
States was bogged down in a quagmire in the war in Iraq and intense conflicts
were breaking out between the ruling and opposition parties. Within the Bush
administration, the neoconservatives fell into disgrace, and a number of individuals at the helm of the Defense Department such as [Donald] Rumsfeld and
[Paul] Wolfowitz left one after the other. Regarding such major issues as the Iraq
War, military transformation, and future military development, many people
have undergone [a transition to] new thinking. Although the new “maritime
strategy” is not the result of systematic reflection, in many ways it has already
revealed these development trends.
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The new “maritime strategy” indicates a transformation in U.S. thinking
concerning the use of military force. As the only superpower in the world today,
on the basis of comprehensive national strength, the United States obviously
enjoys a superior status. No one doubts U.S. hard power, especially its powerful military strength. However, since “9/11,” the United States has pursued a
unilateralist foreign policy and relied excessively on military means to resolve
all security problems, not only damaging its hard power, but also seriously setting back its soft power. Damage to hard power can possibly be recovered from
in a relatively short period, but damage to soft power requires not only a long
period of great exertion but also policy changes. Since 2007, around the issue
of the use of soft power, the U.S. academic community carried out an unprecedented great discussion. The renowned U.S. think tank “Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS)” held special seminars [in which] former major
government officials and expert scholars such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard
Armitage, [and] Joseph Nye proposed that in order for the U.S. government to
extend its hegemonic rule the United States must attach great importance to the
coordinated use of hard and soft power. [They] proposed to use hard and soft
power in coordination as “rational strength” [smart power] in order to realize
strategic national security goals. This is the context in which the U.S. military’s
new “maritime strategy” was introduced; and many of its proposals reflect this
new way of thinking about achieving national security objectives and safeguarding national strategic interests.
The new “maritime strategy” reflects tentative rethinking of the Iraq War.
As the Iraq War enters its fifth year, the United States has already expended the
high cost of nearly four thousand human lives and five hundred billion U.S.
dollars. Because the war is still continuing, it is difficult to predict its future development. The U.S. military still cannot, and does not, have a systematic summation of conditions in progress, but the U.S. intellectual elite is in the process
of comprehensively rethinking the war, and this is beginning to have an impact
on policy-making departments. At the beginning of the Iraq War, in the face of
universal opposition from the international community, U.S. Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld advanced the unyielding position that “it is not the coalition
that determines the mission, but the mission that determines the coalition.”
Through the passage of time and events, today the U.S. military’s “maritime
strategy” has already taken “international cooperation” as an important principle. This contrast indicates that the United States security and military strategy will face a major new adjustment. The U.S. presidential election has already
begun, and “change” has already become a demand of mainstream American
society. Regardless of whether the Republican Party or the Democratic Party
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comes to power, adjustments and changes in the U.S. government’s foreign policy are inevitable.
The new “maritime strategy” indicates that future U.S. military transformation will have new changes. U.S. military transformation issues were already
mentioned as early as during the Clinton administration, but really started in a
comprehensive manner after Rumsfeld entered the Pentagon. To promote transformation, Rumsfeld put forward a series of radical measures, causing enormous controversy at the high levels of the U.S. military. The war in Iraq, in fact,
became a testing ground for U.S. military transformation. Rumsfeld advanced
restructuring measures, such as large-scale reduction of the army, the reduction
of large-scale combat platforms, and adjustment of the structure and composi作为世界军事变革的领头羊, 美国海上战略变化值得关注.
As a bellwether of world military transformation, U.S. maritime strategic transformation merits
close scrutiny.
tion of troops, etc.; many of which were overturned in the course of the Iraq
War. The newly appointed U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral [Michael] Mullen is not only the new strategy’s planner and organizer, but also has
maintained independent thinking as one of the senior high ranking military
officers. As Chief of Naval Operations, [Admiral] Mullen repeatedly suggested
that “the old maritime strategy had sea control as a goal, but the new maritime
strategy must recognize the economic situation of all nations, [and] not only
control the seas, but [also] maintain the security of the oceans, and enable other
countries to maintain freedom of passage.” It is precisely through his promotion
that the new “maritime strategy” was introduced.
Without any doubt, the U.S. Navy chose the timing of the promulgation of
the new “maritime strategy” to promote its own interests. Military spending
has always been the focus of competition among the armed services. For the
maritime forces to obtain a larger share of the future defense spending pie, they
must lead strategic thinking and initiatives. Six years after the “9/11” incident, it
is difficult to convince people that emphasizing naval development is important
to combat international terrorism. Precisely because of this, some people and
military industrial interest groups have worked together to frequently concoct a
“Chinese naval threat theory” or “Russian maritime threat” argument.
Because of its wide-ranging mobility, the Navy is known as the “international
service.” This distinguishing feature of maritime forces gives them the advantage of viewing the world from a global perspective. In a period of relative peace
and stability, how to employ maritime forces to safeguard national security is the
common task facing each nation’s naval construction. Because the United States
is a country that places maritime power above all others, its maritime strategy

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008

5

Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 4, Art. 7

WA N G BAO F U

67

can be better described as serving its global hegemony rather than safeguarding the world maritime order. As a bellwether of world military transformation,
[therefore], U.S. maritime strategic transformation merits close scrutiny.

T R A N S L AT O R ’ S N O T E

This article was originally published in Study Times, 22 January 2008, www.lianghui.org.cn.
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